Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team Final Report
Fort Hood
Army Internal Review Team: Last Report
Executive Summary
Overview
The Army's Soldiers, Families and Civilians deserve a safe and secure environs to work, train and alive. The Army'south efforts in this regard are non new and they began long earlier the tragic events of 5 November 2009 at Fort Hood, Texas where the Regular army family lost thirteen of its members and 31 wounded. The Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team dedicates the recommendations and plans in this study to the victims and their families with the prospect of precluding such an event from happening in the future.
Equally the Department of Defence (DoD) Independent Review Console made clear in its report, "the initial response to the incident was prompt and effective." Fort Hood's employ of an Active Shooter Response (ASR) model saved lives. Without question, prior mass prey management and training, investment in emergency equipment and coordination with civilian law enforcement and emergency response personnel made a departure. Still, the DoD Independent Review Panel identified 79 recommendations for consideration and/or implementation DoD-wide to reduce the likelihood, react to and recover from hereafter incidents. While much has been achieved, we believe that more than can be done.
Subsequent to the publication of the DoD Independent Review Console'southward study, the Secretary of Defense directed the Services to study dorsum to the Banana Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)), the Services internal review and assessment of "their organization'southward power below the headquarters level to place internal threats and force protection (FP) and emergency response programs, policies and procedures." In response to the Secretary of Defence force's directive, the Regular army Vice Chief of Staff (VCSA) established the Fort Hood Army Internal Review Squad (AIRT). The result of the Internal Review Team'due south endeavor is this report.
Ground forces Installation Assessment and Best Practices
The focus of the Army try is to provide installation commanders the tools they need to support the senior commander'southward mission to protect the force. To that end, the Installation Direction Command (IMCOM) Commander identified the following functions as critical to mission accomplishment:
- 1. All installations must take an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) that is fully capable.
ii. All installation staffs understand the reporting concatenation is through the senior commander, simultaneously to the Army Operations Centre and the respective Regular army Service Component Command (ASCC); ASCCs report to their Combatant Commander.
3. Installations maintain current and comprehensive agreements with key emergency responders in the local customs (law enforcement, fire, medical, etc.).
four. Installation staffs must exercise i through 3 above frequently.
In response to the DoD directive to review and assess the Army'due south ability below the headquarters level to place internal threats and FP and emergency response programs, policies and procedures the Fort Hood AIRT: visited 17 installations; conducted a data call from Army Commands (ACOMs), Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) and the Army National Guard; and surveyed over 80 installation commanders. The installation commanders emphasized the need for funding and personnel to see boosted protection requirements, the demands that effect from implementation of the DoD findings and recommendations and the need to sustain existing equipment. The Army focus is on providing installation commanders the tools they demand to support the senior commander's FP mission. However, the demands of internal and external threats require us to sharpen our focus. To meet these mission disquisitional tasks, the Army must evolve and transform.
Our 17 site visits highlighted an important point: the Regular army is not homogenously-based. Incident reporting practices overseas and incident reporting in the Continental United States (CONUS), coupled with Joint Basing, pb to varied reporting practices. As Fort Hood demonstrated, advice is critical to timely response. ACOMs share concern for prompt, compatible and comprehensive reporting procedures. Installation commanders said they were hampered in their reporting efforts by multiple reporting chains and report formats. In our report, we recommend the Army Thousand-three/5/7 (G-three/5/vii) publish incident reporting procedures from installation level to Headquarters, Department of the Regular army (HQDA).
The Army was well forth a path of change prior to and immediately following the Fort Hood incident. Many initiatives were already in progress to mitigate the insider threat. IMCOM published a campaign plan. Medical Control (MEDCOM) installations volition transfer to IMCOM control by the stop of fiscal year (FY) 2011. Regular army Materiel Control (AMC) and IMCOM are using four installations to conduct a pilot to determine how to transfer AMC special installations to IMCOM control. The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program represents the Army's investment in readiness of the forcefulness and quality of life for our Soldiers, Family members and Civilians. The goal of CSF is to increase resilience and enhance performance past developing the v dimensions of force: concrete, emotional, social, spiritual and family. In lodge to increase resilience in health care providers, the Army Function of the Surgeon Full general (OTSG)/MEDCOM initiated the Care Provider Support Preparation programme, and others, with additional emphasis for behavioral wellness providers. All of these efforts were on-going prior to 5 Nov 2009. Immediately following the Fort Hood incident, the Ground forces Principal of Staff established the Insider Threat Task Force on 16 November 2010, led by the Army G-2 (G-2) and IMCOM Commander that has produced distinctive results in the areas of counterintelligence (CI) and security.
Our "deep dive" identified all-time practices that warrant consideration for adoption across the force: FP assessments of all ACOMs, DRUs and ASCCs by the G-3/five/7 once every three years; the CSF advisers and program; civil support team training; comprehensive and current memoranda of understanding between installations and local emergency response capabilities; cooperative annual emergency response training with local authorities; empowering supervisors equally case managers in employee injury and death cases; partnering with industry in no-price relationships to provide country of the art engineering science; FP compliance worksheets; situational intelligence reports for special events; designated Family unit Assistance Centre (FAC) Teams; reckoner redundancy programs; and using emergency operation equipment that is interoperable with that of local authorities and responders.
DoD Independent Review Console Report Major Areas
The Army is moving forward on the recommendations contained in the DoD Contained Review Panel Report. The DoD report focused on v major areas: Personnel, FP, Information Sharing, Installation Emergency Response and Wellness Affairs. Of the 79 recommendations, the Army has implemented 21 of them and is in varying stages of implementing or partially implementing 45 recommendations pending DoD guidance/policy. The remaining 13 recommendations require DoD policy updates and/or revisions in order for the Ground forces to commence implementation.
In our Personnel review, we found in general the Regular army has sufficient personnel policy guidance for implementing personnel back up programs and services. In some cases, notwithstanding, personnel policy guidance and programs accost unique requirements such as mass casualty, crisis incidents, workplace violence and religious adaptation. To address these update requirements, the Army will provide interim guidance while awaiting development and release of formal DoD policy. The Regular army G1 and Office of the Primary of Chaplains (OCCH) volition atomic number 82 these efforts through work with Under Secretary of Defence force (Personnel & Readiness) USD(P&R) and the War machine Chaplains Lath.
For FP, the Ground forces adult a draft implementation plan for the recommendations in this major area pending receipt of DoD guidance. In our internal review, the Army institute that we possess sufficient policy guidance for implementing protection programs, just lack a synchronizing arrangement or synchronizing part within an existing organization. In most cases, FP policy guidance and programs require updates and/or actions to address unique requirements such as behavioral indicators, real time information sharing, integrated FP policies, internal threats, screening strategies and capabilities. As an example, HQDA conducts protection assessments of each ACOM, ASCC and DRUs one time every three years by identifying trends and problem areas. If regulatory gaps are discovered, that information drives changes to Army policies.
The synopsis of the findings and recommendations in the Information Sharing surface area was the lack of policy, procedures and systems for the sharing of threat related information between the Services, Combatant Commands, DoD and other federal agencies such equally the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The inadequacy of data sharing between critical components of DoD's FP enterprise was the common thread between each of the four findings and seven recommendations in this area. The Army helped to develop the initial policies beingness drafted by DoD to ameliorate information sharing and volition continue this effort until the policies are published. The Army also is working to address the internal data sharing issues constitute by the AIRT during the visits to specific Army installations.
The Army identified and analyzed the Installation Emergency Response issues and is establishing working groups to further address areas of business organisation. The Army established Emergency Management (EM) equally a formal program of record with the release of Ground forces Regulation (AR) 525-27, Army Emergency Management Programme. Section of Defense Pedagogy (DoDI) 6055.17 directs the Services to achieve Initial Operational Adequacy (IOC) no after than 13 January 2011 and Total Operational Capability (FOC) no after than 13 January 2014. IOC requirements focus on initial actions to field and utilize Installation Emergency Managers at all DoD Installations responsible for developing and executing the Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program across all 5 phases of the emergency lifecycle: Preparedness, Mitigation, Prevention, Response and Recovery. FOC targets are a multi-twelvemonth effort requiring the organization, manning, training, equipping and exercising of multiple capabilities across the EM lifecycle addressing all hazards.
To attain FOC, the Army is establishing working groups, led by the Thou-3/5/7, to determine standards, requirements, baseline current systems and developed a plan for acquisition, fielding and sustainment to close identified gaps for implementing the following initiatives: an enhanced 911 (E911) organisation; a Mass Warning and Notification (MWN) arrangement enabling commands to quickly and finer warn the installation of emergencies and direct protective actions before, during and after an incident; and a Common Operating Picture show (COP) adequacy enabling commands to chop-chop and finer substitution information resource requests and coordinate response and recovery operations with ceremonious and military partners.
Additionally, the impact of the Fort Hood Shooting displayed the demand for DoD to institute preventive measures equally well equally identify enhanced methods for emergency response personnel. The Regular army conducted extensive enquiry and incorporated federal, state and local law enforcement best practices into the training curriculum, including ASR, for Regular army Civilian Police, Security Guards and Military machine Constabulary (MPs). The U.Due south. Army Armed forces Police School (USAMPS) adult an ASR Training Support Bundle (TSP) in March 2010 for Army Noncombatant Police force and MPs.
In Health Affairs, the Regular army constitute that it possesses sufficient policy guidance for implementing medical care to include policies that accordingly addressed behavioral wellness atmospheric condition. The Army's OTSG and MEDCOM developed the Comprehensive Behavior Health Organisation of Care Campaign Plan for incorporation into the Army Campaign Plan. Its purpose is to clearly delineate existing policies, procedures and guidance to plant minimum standards for Traumatic Outcome Management (TEM), Soldier and Health Care Provider back up.
Quick Wins
The Army began taking action to improve EM before and since publication of the DoD Independent Review Panel'south report. Prior to the publication of this report, the Army implemented 10 "quick wins."
1. In an active shooter scenario, the response is activity, non cordon; the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) and the USAMPS, with the aid of the Thou-3/5/vii, now trains all military and civilian constabulary enforcement to respond with proven tactics.
2. MPs are now authorized to use jacketed hollow bespeak ammunition to reduce the hazard of injury to innocent bystanders.
3. The General Officer Direction Function revised General Officer assignment orders to expressly reflect senior commander authorities, responsibilities and duties.
4. Full general Officers selected every bit a senior commander are required to attend the General Officer/Senior Commander Class at the Army Management Staff College and are trained on the Army'due south EM programme to improve their understanding prior to an bodily emergency.
five. In order to identify internal and external threats to Regular army personnel, the G-2 initiated a rapid revision and re-titled AR 381-12, formerly Subversion and Espionage Directed Confronting the Regular army (SAEDA), at present Threat Sensation and Reporting to include additional observable indicators for espionage, terrorism and extremism. The AR has completed legal review and is waiting for approving from the Army Publishing Directorate.
6. The Army developed and implemented the iSalute CI reporting system via "Army Knowledge Online" and "Army Knowledge Online – Secure" internet based reporting links in April 2010. The G-2 and Chief Information Officeholder/Chiliad-vi adult and implemented the reporting platforms enabling any Soldier or civilian with an Army Knowledge Online or Army Knowledge Online – Secure account to report a suspicious activity to Ground forces CI.
vii. The Army's new iWATCH program promotes anti-terrorism across all commands and leverages every member of the Army community equally a sensor with reporting at the local level.
eight. As a new paradigm for dealing with trauma regardless of origin, the Army implemented the TEM Course at the Ground forces Medical Department (AMEDD) Centre and School. This grade trains behavioral health providers, related healthcare professionals and Unit of measurement Ministry building Teams in traumatic consequence direction and standardizes how the Regular army will provide trauma management.
nine. The Regular army Surgeon General and MEDCOM implemented Intendance Provider Support training to teach healthcare providers how to manage stressors unique to providing wellness care.
x. The U.s.a. Army Offense Center, in concert with the FBI Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS), amended the CJIS Security Policy authorizing contract security guards (CSGs) access to the National Crime Information Middle (NCIC). This change enables installations without police enforcement personnel the power to conduct criminal checks on civilians attempting to enter the installation.
The above demonstrates that the Army tin can rapidly adapt, but in that location are enduring FP challenges that require subject area. The Army must address a number of of import initiatives in our standard management forums: Forcefulness Structure Panel, concept plan approval process, the Budget Requirements and Programming (BRP) lath process and constitute decision points in the Ground forces Campaign Programme.
Emerging Ideas
There are a number of initiatives the Army must implement in order to address systemic challenges with our current procedures to protect the forcefulness. In order to move frontwards, the Army must address these issues in our standard management forums, such as our force structure validation procedure documented by the concept plan approval procedure and our BRP, all tracked by establishing decision points in the Army Campaign Program.
Our electric current protection procedures autumn short of synchronizing policy, establishing priorities and allocating resources to accomplish the desired end country. The Army senior leadership is not given the opportunity to bear upon the cease land because they cannot review the portfolio of protection related functions on a recurring basis.
The Regular army must implement goals and objectives every bit directed by the Secretarial assistant of the Regular army in his directive on Army Protection in April 2008. In this directive Secretarial assistant Geren clearly designated the G-3/5/seven as the staff agent responsible for Regular army Protection Policy. Implementing this directive corrects shortfalls in how nosotros implement policy, prioritize requirements and plan necessary resource to come across current and emerging protection requirements at our installations. Our current procedure does non synchronize all Ground forces protection-related functions into a coherent program to maximize security providing unity of effort. As an instance within the EM function, nosotros will likely neglect to meet National Incident Direction System (NIMS) IOC and FOC mandated milestones, unless we transform how the Army manages this program.
Additionally, the Regular army must adapt to procedures put in place since Secretary Geren signed Army Directive 2008-02. ACSIM has proposed changes to the 2011 Army Campaign Plan that identifies "Provide a Safe & Secure Working & Living Environment" as Major Objective two-seven which is nested in Campaign Objective "Provide an Effective Protection Adequacy at Army Installations" (run into Appendix G). The Army should designate the G-iii/5/seven pb for Major Objective 2-7 every bit office of the Army Campaign Plan process.
Currently, installation commanders identify and prioritize EM equipment they need. Equipment is not direct funded, procured locally and must compete for sustainment. Nosotros recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the establishment of an Army funding line for centralized management of the equipment and the Army Acquisition Executive engage a Plan Manager(south) with resource and authority for life cycle direction of EM equipment. The Army must designate this equipment as "programs of record" and program the funding necessary to attain both IOC and FOC every bit outlined in current DoDI and the NIMS and National Response Framework (NRF).
The squad institute the legal authority of CSGs to respond to an active shooter threat is unclear. The lack of clarity is exacerbated by the multiple types of jurisdictions on our installations: exclusive (Federal), proprietary (State), or concurrent. Over the past nine years, the Regular army has relied heavily on CSGs. This is changing. IMCOM is actively converting its ane,679 CSGs to Department of the Army Security Guards (DASGs) and volition complete force revisions by the finish of FY 2010. In the years since 9/xi, the Department and Service Secretaries contracted for increased performance of security guard functions on the authority provided in periodic annual National Defense Say-so Acts. In this era, the Army must anticipate "in-sourcing" and consider how to span FP requirements with available resources.
The effort to convert CSGs to DASGs did not extend to non-IMCOM installations and there is confusion associated with their adequacy, authority and take chances associated with their use. Currently, AMC has 540 CSGs and the Us Regular army Corps of Engineers has 79. We need to ensure that nosotros tin can respond finer to an active shooter scenario, particularly at Army installations without a installation commander ("non-traditional/separate facilities"). Nosotros also demand to ensure that CSGs receive training on the new active shooter scenario across the Army. The Regular army must definitively establish the limitations of regime for CSGs given the various jurisdictions in which we operate. We recommend that OPMG lead a cost-benefit-gamble analysis to determine the best means for FP and security at all installations, including non-traditional/divide facilities. The Army must use this analysis to establish clear policy and procedures regarding the authority and actions of CSGs in response to an active shooter and a standard equipping package for all Army security personnel.
Several initiatives will affect strength structure of the garrison staff. As an instance, the Army concurred with DoD's recommendation to use the FBI's east-Guardian Arrangement reporting suspicious activity. This action volition result in an increase in personnel and equipment requirements across the Army. Another case is where installation commanders reported that they did not have the resources to adequately conduct installation threat analysis and that they do not receive necessary levels of external support for threat analysis. Consequently, the K-2, One thousand-iii/5/7 and OPMG are working to develop a strategic data sharing concept to provide timely data, allowing installation commanders admission to critical information aimed at protecting their force. This concept program uses a combination of data sharing engineering and personnel to ensure robust information sharing that should be presented to the ASA(I&Due east), then forwarded to the G-3/5/seven for validation. We recommend the Regular army develop an installation staff Battle Control Training Plan which could result in increased resources requirements for both the installation and US Army Preparation and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Lastly, to enable IOC and FOC for IEM, the Army will require trained and certified EM professionals.
Summary
We must efficiently and effectively transform how we look at protecting the force. Many of the DoD Independent Review Panel recommendations and the emerging ideas developed past the Fort Hood AIRT require further staffing and policy review for a complete solution. The Ground forces must ensure that an enterprise approach is used to further develop our recommendations and emerging ideas. The arroyo must using existing forums, such as the SICE Board, to fully vet and nowadays to the Ground forces Senior Leadership for decision every bit role of the Regular army Entrada Plan. Every bit part of the vetting process, the Army must also accept this opportunity to explore other Services' solutions and interact with the Office of the Secretary of Defence force (OSD) to ensure success against our Nation'south internal, external and asymmetric threats.
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